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I. Introduction
Social Security' does not provide retirement income in a vacuum. Rather,
commentators often refer to our national retirement income system as a three-
legged stool, with Social Security representing one of the legs and employer-
sponsored pension plans2 and individual savings representing the other two
legs.3 Because changes in one leg of the stool are likely to have a direct
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. The author is
grateful to Merton Bernstein, Robert Myers, and Carol Weiser for their comments on earlier
drafts of this Article. The author also thanks Jack VanDerhei for the valuable insights he pro-
vided in a conversation with the author.
1. This Article uses the term Social Security in its generally accepted sense as referring
to the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) cash benefit program.
2. For purposes ofthis Article, the terms "retirement plan" and "pension" or "pension plan"
will be used interchangeably and will refer to both defined benefit and defined contribution plans.
3. See ChristopherBoneAnActuarialPerspecfive onHowSocialSecuri Reform Could
InfluenceEmployer-SponsoredPensions,inPROSPECTSFRSoaaSEcRrrEFORm333,333
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impact onthe other two legs,4 policymakers must not consider Social Security
changes in isolation, but should take account oftheir effect on employer-spon-
sored pensions and individual savings.5
This Article6 analyzes how one of the most popular proposals, partial
privatization,' would likely affect private pensions! For purposes of this Ar-
(Olivia S. Mitchelletal. eds., 1999) ("The U.S. retirement income system has often been described
as a three-legged stool, with the three supports of the stool being social security, employer-
sponsored retirement plans, and individual savings."); see also Kathryn L. Moore, Privatization
ofSocialSecuriy: MisguidedReform, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 131,165 n.202 (1998) (noting that eco-
nomic security for elderly is provided through federal needs-tested program called Supplemental
Security Income and private initiative, as well as Social Security) (citing MERTON C. BERNSTEIN
& JoANBRODSHAUGBERNSTEN, SOCIALSEcuRrIY: TsE SYSTEMTHATWORKS 137(1988)).
4. SeeERISAINDUS. COMM., THEViTALCoNN1cTION: ANANALYSISOFTBEIMPACTOF
SOCIAL SECURIrY REFORM ON EMYER-SPONSORED RETIREMENT PLANS 13 (1998) ("Many
reform proposals advocated today - such as the creation of individual Social Security savings
accounts, investment of Social Security funds in the private sector, substantial reductions in the
Sociai Security defined benefit, increases in the Social Security eligibility age, and increased
taxes - will have a dramatic impact on the employer-sponsored plans and, indeed, on the
employer-employee relationship."); U.S. SENATE, 97TH CONG., COMM., LINKAGES BETWEEN
PRIVATEPENSIONSANDSOCIALSECURYLREFoRI, ANINFORMAnONPAPERPREPAREDFoRUSE
BY THE SPECIAL COMQrE ON AGING, at III (Comm. Print 1982) [hereinafter LINKAGES]
(asserting that "it is clear that changes in benefits or costs associated with social security will
result in individual or employer decisions to change pension plan provisions, personal savings
behavior, or employment choices").
5. LNKAGES, supra note 4, at Ill ("[I]t would be a mistake to view social security financ-
ing in isolation, on the assumption that income from other retirement income sources would
remain fixed in the event of changes in social security. ... It is, therefore, important that these
relationships be taken into account in reviewing social security policy options for the long term.").
6. Policymakers and analysts debate many aspects of Social Security reform, but pay little
attention to how Social Security proposals would affect employer-sponsored pensions. For some
of the few studies on the subject, see ERISA INDUS. COMM., supra note 4 (describing how Social
Security reformcould affectprivatepensions); U.S. GEN.AcCOUNTINGOFFICE, SOCIALSECURnY
REFORM IMPUCATIONSFORPRVATEPENONS (GAO/HEHS-00-187, Sept 2000)(same); Bone,
supra note 3, at 333 (same); JaniceM. GregoyPossibleEmployerResponsestoSocialSecurity
Reforn, in PROSPECTS FOR SOCIAL SECURTY REFORM 313 (Olivia S. Mitchell etal. eds., 1999)
(same);seealsoANDREA.SAMwIcK,TE] FECIOFSocAL SEcuRryONPRvATEPENIONs,
(Stanford Inst. for Econ. Policy Research Discussion Paper No. 00-17, Dec. 2000) (developing
and implementing model to analyze likely effects of various Social Security reform proposals on
design of private pensions). In addition, certain members of the ABA Tax Section prepared
comments concerning private sector pensions and social security reform. See Letter from Stefan
F. Tucker, Chair, Section of Taxation, ABA, to J. Mark Iwxy, Benefits Tax Counsel, Department
of Treasury (June 25,1999), available athtlp'/www.abanet.orgtaxpubpolicyl19991june1599.
html#3 (regarding "Comments Concerning Internal Revenue Code Issues Relating to Private
Sector Pensions and Social Security Reform"). For an earlier study prepared for the Special
Senate Committee on Aging, see LINKAGES, supra note 4.
7. For a discussion of some leading partial privatization proposals, see, for example,
Kathryn L. Moore, PartialPrivatization ofSocialSecurify: AssessingtRs Effect on Women, Mi-
norities, andLower-Income Workers, 65 Mo. L. REV. 341,346-47 (2000).
8. The Article does not discuss pensions offered by state and local governments.
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ticle, partial privatization refers to proposals that direct part of Social Secu-
rity's funding to individual accounts.
This Article first examines how partial privatization would likely affect
the integration rules and integrated plans. It then considers how partial privat-
ization would likely affect (1) employees' demand for defined benefit plans,
(2) employees' willingness and ability to contribute to employer-sponsored
defined contribution plans, (3) employees' investment behavior with respect
to the assets in their employer-sponsored plans, and (4) investment returns
available to employer-sponsored plans.
If. Interaction with Integration Rules and Integrated Plans
Section 401 (1) of the Internal Revenue Code9 is the one area of retirement
law that expressly coordinates private pensions and Social Security.' ° In es-
sence, the § 401(1) "permitted disparity" or "integration" rules" permit Social
Security benefits to be taken into account in determining whether a pension
plan discriminates in favor of highly compensated employees. 2 Section
401(a)(4)"3 ofthe Internal Revenue Code requires that an employer-sponsored
9. 26 U.S.C. § 401() (1994).
10. See Nancy J. Altman, Rethinking Retirement Income Policies: Nondiscrimination,
Integration, and the Questfor Worker Security, 42 TAX L. REV. 435, 437 n.7 (1987) (noting
that "[tihere is almost no explicit coordination even about nonbenefits matters").
11. The 1942 Revenue Act introduced the concept of"integration." The Tax Reform Act
of 1986 substantially modified the "integration" rules and introduced the term "permitted dis-
parity." For a detailed discussion of the legislative history of the integration rules and the
changes wrought by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, see GEOFFREY KOUMAN & RAY SCHMITT,
EFFECTOFPENSIONINT GRATiONONRETREmENTBENEFrrS I (Cong. Res. Serv.,Pub. No. 94-
974, 1994); Altman, supra note 10, at 475-94; Patricia E. Dilley, The Evolution ofEntitlement:
Retirement Income and the Problem of Integrating Private Pensions and Social Security, 30
LOY. LA L. REV. 1063, 1142-79 (1997). Although the Code currently provides for "permitted
disparity" rather than "integration," this Article will use the term "integration" because commen-
tators continue to use this term to refer to the § 401(1) rules. See, e.g., JOHN H. LANGBEIN &
BRUCE A. Woix, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 318-26 (3d ed. 2000); PETER J.
WIEDENBECK&RUSSELLK. OSGOOD, CASES ANDMATEIASONEMPLOYiE BENEFIS 332-54
(1996); Rosann C. lllian, Integration, in UNDERSTANDINGERISA2000: ANINTRODUCTION
TO BASIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT BENEFITS (July 2000), available at WL 471 PLI/Tax 327
(2000); see also DANM MCGILLET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 323 n.3 (7th
ed. 1996) ("'Correlation' is perhaps a more descriptive term for the concept and process, but
the word 'integration' is too deeply embedded in pension literature and regulatory language to
change the terminology. As noted below, however, the nomenclature is already changing, with
Congress and the IRS adopting 'permitted disparity' as the new term.").
12. See Millian, supra note 11, at 331 ("Integration is the recognition of social security
benefits in the design of private pension benefits.").
13. 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(4) (1994). For a detailed discussion of the Section 401(aX4)
nondiscrimination rules, see, for example, Mark S. Dray, The Nondiscrimination Rules Under
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retirement plan's benefits or contributions not discriminate in favor of highly
compensated employees14 for the plan to qualify15 and thus be eligible for
favorable tax treatment.16 Section 401(a)(5)(C) of the Internal Revenue Code
provides that a plan shall not be considered discriminatory within the meaning
of § 401(a)(4) merely beamuse it discriminates in favor of highly compensated
employees in a manner permitted by § 401(/) of the Code. 7
Based on data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics' 1996 and 1997 Em-
ployee Benefits Surveys,18 49% of full-time workers in large- and medium-
size firms who participate in a defined benefit plan are covered by a benefit
formula that is expressly integrated with Social Security, 9 while 44% of full-
time workers in small firms who participate in a defined benefit plan are
covered by a benefit formula that is expressly integrated with Social Securi-
ty.2° Although "there are no published data on the prevalence of integration
in defined contribution plans," 21 it appears that defined contribution plans are
much less likely to be expressly integrated with Social Security than are
Code Section 401(a)(4), A.LJ.-A.BA. Course of Study (2000), available at WL SF04 ALI-
ABA 31.
14. The term "highly compensated employee" is defined in § 414(q) of the Internal Rev-
enue Code and generally refers to employees who earn more than $80,000 (indexed for infla-
tion) each year or own more than five percent of their employer. See 26 U.S.C. § 414(q)(1)
(1994).
15. For a general overview of the qualified plan requirements, see, for example, LANG-
BEIN & Wox, supra note 11, at 234-39. For a more detailed discussion of these requirements,
see, for example, Leonard S. Hirsh, Plan Qualification Requirements, UNDERsTAINNG ERISA
2000: AN INTRODUCTION TO BAsIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT BENEFIrs, available at WL 471
PLV-Tax25.
16. For an overview of the economic benefits of tax qualification, see, for example,
LANGBEN & WOLK, supra note 11, at 229-32.
17. See26U.S.C. §401(aX5XC)(1994).
18. For discussions of the prevalence of integration in earlier years, see, for example,
KOLI.MAN & ScHMrrr, supra note 11, at 7; Dilley, supra note 11, at 1166; Donald Bell & Diane
HIll, How Social Security Payments Affect Private Pensions, MONTHLY LAB. REV., May 1984,
at 15; Avy D. Graham, CoordinatingPrivate Pension Benefits with Social Securit, MONTHLY
LAB. REV., March 1994, at 35.
19. U.S. DEP'TOFLABOREMPLOYE-BENwrrS INMEDIUMANDLARGEPRIVATEESTAB-
Lum TS, 1997, at 106 tbl.131 (1999), available athttp//stats.bls.govlebshome.htm.
20. See BUPEAUOFLABOR STATISTICS, E MPLOYEE BENEFITS IN SMAILPRIVATE FSTAB-
SS-MENTs, 1996, at 74 tbl.75 (1999), available athttp'//stats.bls.gov/ebshome.htm.
21. Keith A. Bender, Characteristics of Individuals with Integrated Pensions, 62 Soc.
SEc. BULL. 28, 37 n.1 (No. 3 1999); see also Pamela Perun, Abstract ofSocial Security Inte-
gration: A Cross-Sectional andLongitudinalAnatvsis, available athttp'/www.bc.edu/becorg/
avp/csomfexecutivelcrr/perun.shtml (last visited Sept. 28, 2001) (noting that "[tihere are no
studies which give a comprehensive picture of the extent of Social Security integration in the
private pension system" and announcing new study that will provide "a more accurate assess-
ment of the extent of Social Security integration in the private pension system").
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defined benefit plans.'
Some plans that are not expressly integrated with Social Security rely on
integration to satisfy the nondiscrimination requirements. The Treasury regu-
lations' "imputed permitted disparity" rules,' which are based on the § 401(1)
integration rules,24 permit plans that are not expressly integrated with Social
Security to take Social Security benefits into account in determining whether
the plan discriminates in favor of highly compensated employees in general
testing ofthe plan. Unfortunately, there are no reliable statistics on how many
plans rely on imputed disparity to satisfy the § 401(a)(4) nondiscrimination
requirement.
25
Commentators typically offer two justifications for the integration rules. 6
First, at least nominally,V employers are required to pay one-half ofthe Social
Security payroll tax,' and the integration rules allow employers to offset at
least part of this cost." Second, because Social Security replaces a larger
22. See Bender, supra note 21, at 37 n4 (noting that based on data fromthe 1992 Health
and Retirement Survey, only 7.6% of workers solely covered by defined contribution plans have
contribution formula expressly integrated with Social Security); see also Graham, supra note
18, at 35-36 (contending, based on data from 1991, that integrated defined contribution plans
were quite rare while integrated defined benefit plans were more common); Chuck Slusher, Pen-
sion Integration andSocialSecurity Reform, 61 Soc. SEC. BuLL. 20,22 (No. 3 1998) (finding,
based on data from 1993 Employee Benefits Survey for medium and large private firms and
1992 Employee Benefits Survey for small private firms, that about 20% of all full-time, private
sector employees in United States in 1992-1993 participated in integrated defined benefit plan,
while less than 2% of workers aged 51-61 in 1992 ever participated in an integrated defined
contribution plan based on data from 1992 Health and Retirement Survey).
23. See Treas. Reg. § 1A01(aX4)-(7) (as amended in 2000).
24. See MCGILLETAL, supra note 11, at 325 ("The rules limiting the amount ofdisparity
that can be imputed to employees are almost identical to the rules limiting the amount of dispar-
ity permitted in a plan's benefit formula.").
25. See Gregory, supra note 6, at 320 ("[Sltatistics are not available on the number of
plans that do not integrate their contributions or benefits with social security but that use per-
mitted disparity in meeting the Internal Revenue Code nondiscrimination rules.").
26. For additional justifications for permitted disparity or integration, see, for example,
KOL1MAN & SCHMrT, supra note 11, at I (noting that "private pensions and social security
benefits should not be duplicative"); Bender, supra note 21, at 29 (stating that integration per-
mits, within limits, higher pension benefits for highly-paid workers, thereby allowing firms to
retain and motivate highly skilled workers).
27. Cf AUiCrAH. MuNmI., THEFUJRE OF SOCIAL SEcuarY 86-87 (1977) (noting that
based on model of cost-minimizing behavior of firms, most economists believe that entire Social
Security payroll tax is borne by employees even though half of tax is nominally placed on
employers); WIEDENBECK & OSGOOD, supra note 11, at 340 ("Treating one-half of social
security as employer financed is naive, however, because the true burden of the FICA taxes (the
economic incidence) is independent of the payment obligation (the legal incidence).").
28. 26 U.S.C. § 3101(a) (1994).
29. See, e.g., KOLIMAN& SCHMrr, supra note 11, at 1; LANGBEIN & WOIY supra note
11, at 318; Altman, supra note 10, at 480; Bender, supra note 21, at 29; Dilley, supra note 11,
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percentage of the pre-retirement earnings of the lower-paid than that of the
higher-paid,30 some lower-paid workers might receive combined pension and
Social Security benefits that exceed 100% of their pre-retirement earnings
absent the integration rules.3
This section begins by providing a general overview of the § 401(l)
integration rules. It then explains how partial privatization would likely affect
the integration rules and integrated plans. Because partial privatization pro-
posals vary widely and details matter, the discussion focuses on two specific
partial privatization proposals, the 1994-1996 Advisory Council on Social
Security's Individual Account (IA) plan32 and the Personal Security Account
at 1074,1140,1164-65; Gregory, supra note 6, at 319. Butsee BERNSTEIN& BERNSTEIN, supra
note 3, at 137 (1988) (objecting to integration rules because they "credit the employer with half
of each employee's lifetime FICA contributions made by all of that individual's employers, an
unduly favorable basic assumption. In contrast, the employer makes contributions only for its
plan participants."); Dilley, supra note 11, at 1187 (contending that because Social Security
benefits are based on earnings and not contributions, "the presumption underlying pension
integration - that employers should get 'credit' in the private pension relationship for contribu-
tions to the public program - is per se invalid").
30. Specifically, for those reaching age sixty-two in 2001, the Social Security benefit
formula replaced 90% of the first $561 of average indexed monthly earnings (AIME), plus 32%
ofAIME between $561 and $3,381, plus 15% ofAIME above $3,381 up to the maximum pos-
sible AIME. See Social SecurityAdministration, Cost-of-Livinglncrease and OtherDetermina-
tionsfor the Year 2001,65 Fed. Reg. 63663,63666 (Oct 24, 2000). As aresultofthe application
of this progressive benefit formula, Social Security benefits replace about 56% of the AIME of
workers with low lifetime covered earnings, 42% of the AnIE of workers -with average lifetime
covered earnings, and 28% of the AIME of workers with lifetime covered earnings at or above
the maximum taxable wage base. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SOCIAL SECtmrrY: DIF-
FERENTAPPROACHES FORADDRESSiNGPROaRAMSOLVFICY 15 n.7 (GAO/HEHS-98-33,1998).
31. See KOLIMAN& SCHM=r, supra note 11, at 1 (stating that "without integration, com-
bined pension and Social Security benefits for lower wage employees can exceed pre-retirement
income"); Bender, supra note 21, at 29 (noting that "without integration, some low paid workers
could be much more likely to receive combined pension and Social Security benefits that are
greater than their pre-retirement earnings"); Dilley, supra note 11, at 1074, 1165 (positing that
"integration in some form is necessary to prevent.., retirement income from the combination
of Social Security and private pensions exceed[ing] pre-retirement earnings"); Gregory, supra
note 6, at 319; Daniel L Halperin, Retirement Security and Tax Equity: An Evaluation of
ERIS4, 17 B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REV. 739,762 (1976) (stating that without integration, lower
paid employees could receive annuities from private plans and Social Security in excess of pre-
retirement income).
32. I U.S. ADVISORy COUNCIL ON Soc. SEC., REPORT OF TBE 1994-1996 ADvIsORY
COUNCiL ON SOCiAL SECURITY 28-29 (1997) [hereinafter ADViSORY COUNCaL REPORT]. The
highlights of the IA plan may be summarized as follows: The IA plan recommends that in-
dividual accounts (LAs) be established for participants, that the IA's be funded by a mandatory
additional employee contribution of 1.6% of covered payroll, that individuals' investments be
limited to government-managed index funds, and that the IA balances be converted to single or
joint minimum guarantee indexed annuities upon retirement Id. The plan further contemplates
retaining the current 90% replacement rate for low earnings while decreasing the replacement
rates for middle and high earnings from 32% and 15% to 22.4% and 10.5% respectively,
EYFECTS OF PARTIAL PRIVATIZATION ONPRIVATE PENSIONS 1261
(PSA) plan.33 The Article focuses on these particular proposals because they
fairly represent the range of proposals currently under consideration, and the
Advisory Council traditionally has played an important role in policymaking.34
A. Overview ofIntegration Rules
There are two basic approaches to integration: the excess approach and
the offset approach. Under the excess approach, which can apply to both
defined benefit35 and defined contribution 6 plans, the plan provides higher
benefits (in the case of a defined benefit plan) or contributions (in the case of
a defined contribution plan) with respect to compensation above an integration
accelerating and extending the currently scheduled increase in the normal retirement age, alter-
ing spouse and survivor benefits, and basing benefits on thirty-eight rather than thirty-five years
of earnings. Id.
33. See id. at 30-33. The highlights of the PSA plan may be summarized as follows: The
PSA plan recommends that personal security accounts (PSAs) be established for participants,
that the PSAs be funded by reallocating five percentage points of the employee's share of the
current OASI tax, that the PSAs be individually owned, privately managed, and subject to lim-
ited regulatory constraints, that the funds be freely available for withdrawal at age sixty-two, and
that any funds remaining in the individual's PSA at death be includible in the individual's estate.
The plan provides for a flat first tier benefit for all workers under age twenty-five in 1998 equal
to $410 per month in 1996 dollars, orthe equivalent of 65% of the current poverty level for an
elderly person living alone or 76% of the benefit payable to a low wage worker retiring in 1996.
Benefits under the new system would be phased in for workers between the ages oftwenty-five
and fifty-five in 1996. The PSA plan further contemplates accelerating and extending the cur-
rently scheduled increase in the normal retirement age and increasing the earliest eligibility age,
and altering spouse, survivor, and disability benefits. The PSA plan's proponents recognize that
the plan would involve "transition costs" that could be financed in a number of different ways.
Id.
34. See authorities cited in Moore, supra note 3, at 149 n.108. The 1994-1996 Advisory
Council, however, may play a less significant role in policymaking than previous Advisory
Councils because "historically the importance of the Advisory Council was in large part due to
its ability to reach consensus" and the 1994-1996 Advisory Council did not reach consensus.
Id.
35. See 26 U.S.C. § 401(i)(3XA) (1994); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.401C)-1(cX16Xi) (as
amended in 1993) ("Defined benefit excess plan means a defined benefit plan under which the
rate at which employer-provided benefits are determined with respect to average annual com-
pensation above the integration level under the plan (expressed as a percentage of such average
annual compensation) is greater than the rate at which employer-provided benefits are deter-
mined with respect to average annual compensation at or below the integration level (expressed
as a percentage of such average annual compensation.").
36. See 26 U.S.C. § 401Q(X2) (1994); see also Treas. Reg. § 1A01)-1(cXl6Xii) (as
amended in 1993) ("Defined contribution excess plan means a defined contribution plan under
which the rate at which employer contributions are allocated to an account of employee with
respect to plan year compensation above the integration level (expressed as a percentage of such
plan year compensation) is greater than the rate at which employer contributions are allocated
to account of an employee with respect to plan year compensation at or below the integration
level (expressed as a percentage of such plan year compensation).").
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level than with respect to compensation at or below the integration level.
Under the offset approach, which only applies to defined benefit plans," the
plan provides that an employee's benefit is reduced or offset by a specified
percentage of the employee's final average compensation up to the plan's off-
set level. "An offset plan may be thought of as a simple formula of A minus
B equals C, where 'A' is the annual pension accrual, 'B' is the social security
benefit offset, and 'C' is the amount of the pension check."3" Over the past
twenty years, employers have shifted away from defined benefit offset plans
to defined benefit excess plans.39
Regarding excess plans, § 401(1) imposes limits on the amount by which
benefits or contributions with respect to compensation above the integration
level may exceed benefits or contributions with respect to compensation below
the integration level. With respect to offset plans, § 401(o imposes limits on
the amount by which benefits below the offset level may be offset.40 The
limits are related but not completely tied to Social Security benefits.
Specifically, with respect to defined contribution excess plans,41 § 401(4
provides that employer contributions with respect to compensation above the
integration level may exceed contributions with respect to compensation below
the integration level as long as contributions with respect to compensation
above the integration level (the "excess contribution percentage")42 do not ex-
ceed contributions with respect to compensation below the integration level
(the '"base contribution level")43 by morethan the lesser ofthe base contribution
37. See 26 U.S.C. § 401((3)B); see also Treas. Reg. § 1A01(l)-l(cX25) (as amended
in 1993) ("Offset plan means a defined benefit plan that is not a defined benefit excess plan and
that provides that each employee's employer-provided benefit is reduced or offset by a specified
percentage ofthe employee's final average compensation up to the offset level under the plan.").
38. KoLMAN&SCmr, supra note 11, at 5.
39. See OLIVIA S. MITCHE, NEW TRENDS IN PENSION BENEFIT AND RETMEMERr
PROVISIONS (NBER Working PaperNo. 7381,tbl.11, Oct 1999), available athttpJlwww.nber.
org/papers/w7381 (basing findings on data from medium and large firms, showing that between
1980 and 1997, percentage of full-time participants covered by integrated defined benefit offset
plan fell from 30% to 13% while percentage of participants covered by integrated defined
benefit excess plan increased from 16% to 36%).
40. In addition, the Treasury regulations provide for maximum permitted disparity limita-
tions where an employee participates in more than one plan maintained by the employer during
a plan-year, and they provide for limitations on the total maximum disparity which may be
provided with respect to an employee's total years of service either under a single plan or mul-
tiple plans of the employer. See Treas. Reg. § 1.401(/)-5(a) (as amended in 1995).
41. For a more detailed discussion ofintegration as applied to defined contribution plans,
see, for example, McHAELJ. CANAN, QuAUFI RETREMENT AND OTHEREMPLOYEBENEFr
PLANS § 10.3; MCGILLET AL, supra note 11, at 325-26; Pamela D. Perdue, PermittedDispar-
ity, Basic Law ofPensions, Welfare Plans, and Deferred Compensation, available at WL SF04
AL.L-A.B-.A 147,151-60 (July 2000).
42. 26 U.S.C. § 401Q(X2)(BXi) (1994).
43. Id. § 401(Q(2)(BXii).
1262
EFFECTS OF PARTIAL PRIVATIZATION ON PRIVATE PENSIONS 1263
percentageM or the greater of (a) 5.7 percentage points" or (b) the percentage
equal to the employer portion of the FICA tax attributable to old age insur-
ance." Currently, the employer portion ofthe FICAtax attributable to old age
insurance is about 5%,4 and 'the Social Security Administration is to advise
the IRS when the rate attributable to old age-insurance rises above 5.7%."48
Thus, for example, the § 401(l) integration rules would permit a defined
contribution plan to provide contributions equal to 4% of compensation below
the integration level and 8% of compensation above the integration level
because the excess contribution percentage of 8% would not exceed the base
contribution percentage of 4% by more than the lesser of the base benefit
percentage of 4% or 5.7%. On the other hand, the integration rules would not
permit a defined contribution plan to provide contributions equal to 6% of
compensation below the integration level and 12% of compensation above the
integration level because the excess contribution level of 12% would exceed
the base contribution percentage of 6% by more than the lesser of the base
contribution percentage of 6% or 5.7%.
The 5.7% excess contribution allowance is tied directly to Social Secu-
rity contributions: it equals the employer's share of contributions to Social
Security old-age and survivors and disability insurance in 1986 (when § 401(o
was amended to include this provision).49 Similarly, "the percentage equal to
the employer portion of the FICA tax attributable to old age insurance" is
expressly tied to Social Security, although it is not yet in effect because the
employer's share of FICA tax attributable to old age insurance is currently (as
of 2001) less than 5.7%."
The Treasury regulations provide that if the integration level is less than
the Social Security taxable wage base,"1 then the 5.7% maximum excess con-
tribution allowance is reduced. 52 This reduction is designed to prevent dis-
44. Ia § 401(/)(2XAXi).
45. Id. § 401()(2XA)CI).
46. Id. § 401Q)(2XAXii)1).
47. Perdue, supra note 41, at 153.
48. LANGBEIN & WoLK, supra note 11, at 319 (citing Conference Report).
49. See Altman, supra note 10, at 487 n.201. Section 401() was added to the Internal
Revenue Code in 1982. See TEFRA, Pub. L. No. 97-248 § 249, 96 Stat. 324, 527 (1982). For
an overview of the § 401(o integration rules as originally enacted, see, for example, Bruce
Wolk, Discrimination Rules for Qualified Retirement Plans: Good Intentions Confront Eco-
nomicReality, 70 VA. L. RaV. 419,445-49 (1984).
50. See Perdue, supra note 41, at 153.
51. Section 401 Q) provides that the integration level cannot exceed the Social Security tax-
ablewage base in effect atthe beginning ofthe plan year. See26 U.S.C. § 401()(5XAXii) (1994).
52. See Tress. Reg. § 1A01(/)-2(dX4) (as amended in 1993) (providing that if integration
level is more than greater of $10,000 or 20% of taxable wage base but not more than 80% of
taxable wage base, 5.7% factor is reduced to 4.3% and if integration level is more than 80% of
1264 58 WASH. &LEE L. REV 1255 (2001)
crimination in favor of highly compensated employees and not to reflect
employer contributions to Social Security. 3 Similarly, the alternative base
contribution percentage limitation 4 is not tied to Social Security, but instead
is designed to ensure that employers make some contribution on behalf of
lower-paid employees.'5 The limitation requires that employers provide con-
tributions with respect to compensation below the integration level that are at
least half the percentage of contributions made with respect to compensation
above the integration level.
With respect to defined benefit excess plans, 6 § 401 () provides that the
excess benefit percentage "may not exceed the base benefit percentage by
more than the maximum excess allowance."5" It then provides that the maxi-
mum excess allowance with respect to benefits attributable to any year of
service taken into account with respect to the plan is the lesser of the base
benefit percentage or 0.75%."' The maximum excess allowance with respect
to total benefits is the lesser of the base benefit percentage or 0.75% times the
participant's years of service (not to exceed thirty-five years) 9 taken into
taxable wage base but not more than amount less than taxable wage base, 5.7% factor is reduced
to 5.4%).
53. As originally proposed, the Section 401(o regulations would have required defined
contribution excess plans to use the Social Security taxable wage base as the integration level
because "a lower integration level creates a significant potential for discrimination in favor of
the highly compensated." See Preamble, 53 Fed. Reg. 45,917 (Nov. 15, 1988). See WIEDEN-
BECK & OSGOOD, supra note 11, at 348 for an illustration of this potential discrimination.
54. 26 U.S.C. § 401()(2XA)(i) (1994).
55. Cf. KOILMAN& ScHMIrr,supra note 11, at 5 ("TRA 86 contains provisions to ensure
that all vested employees receive some pension benefits."); McGiL. ET AT., supra note 11, at
324 ("A second new purpose under the Tax Reform Act is to prevent plans from providing little
or no contributions or benefits to the low[er] paid."); Altman, supra note 10, at 488-89 n.203
("The basic ratio limits, however, are essentially arbitrary, having been developed merely to
simplify the existing rules and ensure that all plan participants receive some benefit" (citing S.
REP. No. 313, at 596 (1986))). Prior to the 1986 amendment to the integration rules, employers
could "contribute 5.7% to a defined contribution excess plan with respect to wages above the
integration level and need contribute nothing on wages below the integration level." Altman,
supra note 10, at 487; see also WIEDMOECK& OSGOOD, supra note 11, at 334 (discussing rule
in effect in 1978).
56. For a more detailed discussion of integration as applied to defined benefit excess
plans, see, for example, CANAN, supra note 41, § 103; Perdue, supra note 41, at 160-70.
57. 26 U.S.C. § 40Q)(3XAXi)() (1994). The excess and base benefit percentages are
calculated in the same manner as the excess and base contribution levels, except that the benefit
percentages are based on benefits attributable to the employer's contributions rather than on
contributions. 26 U.S.C. § 401()(3XAXii) (1994).
58. 26 U.S.C. § 401/)(4XAXi) (1994).
59. For workers born after 1928 and retiring in 1991 or later, Social Security benefits are
based on the worker's highest thirty-five years ofwages. See Kathryn L. Moore, Redistribution
Under the Current Social Security System, 61 U. PTr. L. REV. 955, 986 (2000), and authorities
cited therein.
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account under the plan.6°
Thus, for example, the § 401() integration rules would permit a defined
benefit excess plan to provide a benefit of 0.5% of the participant's average
annual compensation up to the integration level for the plan year plus 1% of
his average annual compensation for the plan year in excess of the integration
level, for each year of service up to thirty-five years, because the excess
benefit percentage of 1% does not exceed the base benefit percentage of 0.5%
by more than the lesser of the base benefit percentage of 0.5% or 0.75%. On
the other hand, the integration rules would not permit a defined benefit excess
plan to provide a benefit of 0.5% ofthe participant's average annual compen-
sation up to the integration level for the plan year plus 1.25% of his average
annual compensation for the plan year in excess of the integration level, for
each year of service up to thirty-five years, because the excess benefit percent-
age of 1.25% would exceed the base benefit percentage of 0.5% by more than
the lesser of the base benefit percentage of 0.5% or 0.75%.
With respect to defined benefit offset plans,6' § 401(1) provides that a
participant's accrued benefit in an offset plan may not be reduced by reason
of the offset by more than the maximum offset allowance.62 The maximum
offset allowance with respect to a participant for any year of service taken into
account under the plan is the lesser of 50% of the benefit that would have
accrued without regard to the offset reduction or 0.75% of the participant's
final average compensation.63 The maximum offset allowance with respect
to a participant's total benefits is the lesser of 50% of the benefit that would
have accrued without regard to the offset allowance or 0.75% of the partici-
pant's final average compensation times the participant's years of service (not
to exceed thirty-five) taken into account under the plan. 4
Thus, for example, the integration rules would permit a defined benefit
offset plan to provide a normal retirement benefit equal to 1% of average
annual compensation minus 0.5% of final average compensation up to the
offset level, for each year of service up to thirty-five, because the offset per-
centage of 0.5% is not greater than the lesser of 50% of the benefit that would
have accrued without regard to the offset allowance, which is 0.5%, or 0.75%.
On the other hand, the integration rules would not permit a defined benefit
offset plan to provide a normal retirement benefit equal to 1% of average
annual compensation minus 0.75% of final average compensation up to the
offset level for each year of service up to thirty-five because the offset per-
60. 26 U.S.C. § 401C0X4XAXii) (1994).
61. For a more detailed discussion of integration as applied to defined benefit offset plans,
see, for example, CANAN, supra note 41, § 10.3; Perdue, supra note 41, at 160-70.
62. See 26 U.S.C. § 401(i(3)(BXi) (1994).
63. See id. § 401((4)(BXi).
64. See id. § 401(i(4)(B).
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centage of 0.75% is greater than the lesser of 50% of the benefit that would
have accrued without regard to the offset allowance, which is 0.5/o, or 0.75%.
Just as the 5.7% limitation for defined contribution excess plans is
designed to approximate the Social Security employer contribution rate, the
0.75% factor for defined benefit excess and offset plans is designed to approx-
imate the Social Security benefit accrual rate. 6 According to James Holland,
the Chief of the I.R.S. Pension Actuarial Branch in 1986, the 0.75% factor
was derived from at least three different calculations.
First; it was the result of an extrapolation from the [then] current law
rule with respect to unit benefit excess plans which limits the differential
above and below the integration level, with respect to final salary plans, to
one percent in the absence of ancillary benefits. The 1% is reduced to.75
of 1% to accountfor standard ancillarybenefits.16" The reduction is neces-
sarybecauseancillarybenefits, which constitute the same percentage ofthe
basic benefits of all beneficiaries, increase the percentage differential
between the higher and lower paid, thus disproportionatelybenefitting the
highest paid. (Assume that, without regardto ancillaries, wages above the
integration level are eligible forbenefits equal to 2%; wages below, 1%. If
an ancillary benefit, equal to half the basic benefit is provided, the benefit
becomes 3% and 2% [sic], respectively a differential of 1M%). Second, it
resulted from at least two other calculations which actually produced a
factor of.6 of 1% but whichthen was increased in order to notproduce too
harsh results. One calculationtook the average replacement rate received
by those earning at or above the Social Security taxable wage base (deter-
mined to be 43%), divided that average by 50% in order to credit only the
employer's portion and divided that by 35 in order to prorate the benefit
overthe work-life. Anothercalculationsoughttorelatethe37.5%factor, 6n
andthe covered compensationlevelto [Average Indexed MonthlyEarnings
(AIME)]. t1 Thatis itwas determinedthat37.5% ofcovered compensation
65. See Altman, supra note 10, at 492 ("The.75 of 1% times years of service is intended
to approximate the portion of Social Security benefits attributable to the employer.").
66. Ancillary benefits, also referred to as "derivative" or "auxiliary benefits," are benefits
provided to certain family members of retired, disabled, and deceased workers. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 402(b)-(h) (1994).
67. At the time that § 401() was enacted, the employer portion of the Social Security
benefit for workers who earned the maximum benefit was calculated to be 37.5%. See Rev. Rul.
71-446 § 5, 1971-2 C.B. 187 (1971). "The justification in the regulations for the 37.5% figure
is: The OASDI benefit is considered to be equal to 70% of employees' average monthly wages.
Half of that, or 35%, is considered to be attributable to employer contributions." Altman, supra
note 10, at 482 n.188.
68. The AIME are the average adjusted earnings on which Social Security benefits are
based. The AIME are calculated "by taking the best 35 years of earnings adjusted for past wage
inflation, adding them together and dividing by 420 (the number of months in 35 years)."
Moore, supra note 59, at 986; see 42 U.S.C. § 415(b) (1994).
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(taken to be $16,000) was 26.65% of the maximum AIME for 1986. The
26.65%wasthendividedby35 (againtoproratetheresult) whichproduced
.76 of 1%. That amount, which was then reduced to take into account
ancillary benefits, was determined to be approximately .6 of 1%.69
Treasury regulations provide that ifthe integration level exceeds covered
compensation, defined as the average of the employee's taxable wage base in
effect for each year of the thirty-five year period ending with the year in
which the employee reaches the Social Security retirement age," the 0.75%
factor is reduced.1 The reduction in the 0.75% factor is designed to reflect
the fact that the Social Security replacement rate declines for compensation
in excess of the covered compensation (because such compensation generates
no additional old-age benefits)72 and to prevent discrimination in favor of
highly compensated employees.73 Like the alternative base contribution per-
centage limitation for defined contribution excess plans,74 neither the alterna-
tive base benefit percentage limitation for defined benefit excess plans75 nor
the alternative limitation of 50% of the benefit that would have accrued
without regard to the offset for defined benefit offset plans 6 are tied to Social
Security. Instead, both are designed to ensure that employers make some con-
tribution on behalf of lower-paid employees. 7
69. Altman, supra note 10, at 487-88 rL202 (citations omitted).
70. See 26 U.S.C. § 401Q)(5)(E)(i) (1994); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.401()-1(c)(7)(ii) &
(iii) (as amended in 1993) (providing alternative definitions of covered compensation).
71. See 26 U.S.C. § 401(/)(4)(CXi) (1994); Treas. Reg. § 1A01(Q)-3(dX9) (as amended
in 1993). For a discussion of various possible integration levels and their effect on the 0.75%
factor, see Perdue, supra note 41, at 164-69.
72. See WEDENBECK & OSGOOD, supra note 11, at 346 ("Congress intended that the
reductions for higher integration levels will reflect the decreasing percentages of compensation
replaced by the employer-provided PIA under social security as compensation increases above
covered compensation." (quoting STAFF OF THE JT. CoN ONTAX'N, 100TH CONG., 1 ST SESS.,
GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORMACT OF 1986 (1987))).
73. See WIEDENBECK & OSGOOD, supra note 11, at 348-50.
74. See 26 U.S.C. § 401()(2XA) (1994).
75. See id. §§ 401(/)(4XA), 401QX4)(B).
76. See id. § 401QX4)(B).
77. Cf Altman, supra note 10, at 492 ("[Uinder the new rule, employers who use an
offset formula must, in effect, offer a minimum benefit equal to half the percentage of the bene-
fit provided to the highest paid employees. While this change, again, redistributes employer
benefits to the lower paid in comparison to the current law rule, it fails to address coherently
the question of how to mesh Social Security with private pensions."). As in the case of defined
contribution excess plans, integrated defined benefit plans prior to the 1986 Act could provide
benefits with respect to wages above the integration level without providing any benefits
with respect to wages below the integration level. See KOLLMAN & SCHMITT, supra note 11,
at 4, 9.
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B. Effect of Partial Privatization on Integration Rules
Partial privatization would likely require modification of the integration
rules. The extent of modification, however, depends on the specifics of the
partial privatization proposal.
All partial privatization proposals would fundamentally restructure the
current Social Security system by adding second tier prefunded individual
accounts.78 Thus, the first issue partial privatization raises is how the integra-
tion rules should handle the second tier individual accounts. That, in turn,
depends on how partial privatization is structured.
If, as in the Advisory Council's Individual Account (IAY9 and Personal
Security Account (PSA)80 plans, the second tier individual accounts were
financed solely by employee contributions, then second tier individual ac-
counts should be disregarded for purposes of integration. One ofthe principal
justifications for integration is that, at least nominally, employers pay one half
of the Social Security payroll tax." If employers do not pay any part of the
second tier benefits, then employers should not be entitled to any credit for
these benefits for integration purposes.
If, on the other hand, a partially privatized system provided second tier
benefits that were financed, at least in part, by employer contributions, then
current integration policy suggests that employers should be given credit for
second tier benefits for integration purposes. To the extent that those benefits
were funded by an increase in the employer portion of the Social Security tax,
the current integration rules for defined contribution plans would automati-
cally adjust to any increase in employer contributions required to fund such
benefits." The current integration rules for defined benefit plans, however,
would not adapt as easily to the creation of second tier individual accounts.
Because the second tier individual accounts would constitute defined contri-
bution plans rather than defined benefit plans, it would be quite difficult to
calculate the credit employers should be given for second tier benefits. Like
all defined contribution benefits, second tier individual account benefits
would be based on contributions to the individual accounts and any earnings
and losses on those accounts; there would be no way to know in advance how
much any particular worker would receive from her individual account. The
§ 401(a)(4) cross-testing rules, 3 however, might provide some guidance in
78. For a more detailed discussion of how partial privatization fundamentally differs from
the current system, see Moore, supra note 7, at 346-51.
79. See ADViSORY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 32, at 28-29 (setting forth IA plan).
80. See id. at 30-33 (setting forth PSA plan).
81. See supra note 29 and accompanying text
82. See 26 U.S.C. § 401(/)(2XA)(ii)(I1) (1994).
83. See Treas. Reg. § 1 A01(a)(4)-8 (as amended in 2001).
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determining how contributions to the second tier individual accounts should
be converted to benefits for purposes of calculating the credit employers should
be given for integrated defined benefit plans.
Partial privatization also raises questions about how the integration rules
should handle the first tier benefits. That, in turn, would again depend on the
structure of partial privatization and how it would affect the current system's
funding structure and promised benefits.
If partial privatization were financed by an increase in employer payroll
taxes,84 then the current integration rules for defined contribution plans would
automatically adjust to any increase in employer contributions. If, on the
other hand, partial privatization did not change employer payroll taxes, then
the integration rules for defined contribution plans would remain the same.
The integration rules for defined contribution plans are tied solely to employer
contributions and would not be affected by any change in promised benefits.8"
Unlike the integration rules for defined contribution plans, the integration
rules for defined benefit plans are tied to promised benefits. They would not,
however, automatically adjust to any change in promised benefits. Instead,
the current integration rules for defined benefit plans would likely have to be
expressly amended if partial privatization were to alter benefits promised
under the current system.
Partial privatization proposals differ widely in the extent to which they
would modify benefits promised under the current system. The Advisory
Council's IA plan, for example, would make relatively modest alterations in
the benefits promised by the current system. Specifically, the IA plan would
modify the current benefit fornmula 86 by gradually reducing the replacement
rates for middle and high earnings from 32% and 15% to 22.4% and 10.5%,
respectively, and basing benefits on thirty-eight years of wages rather than
thirty-five years of wages as under the current system. 7 In addition, the IA
84. Depending on how the transition costs of the PSA plan were financed, adoption of
the PSA plan might result in the percentage of the employer portion of the FICA tax attributable
to old age insurance exceeding 5.7%. The PSA plan proponents would prefer to finance the
transition costs through a broad-based consumption tax. See ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT,
supra note 32, at 32. They note, however, that the transition costs could be financed by a 1.52%
supplement to the payroll tax over the next seventy-two years. Id. If the transition costs were
financed by the later increase in the payroll tax and one-half or more of the increased tax were
imposed on employers, the employer portion of the FICA tax attributable to old age insurance
would likely exceed 5.7%.
85. If, however, the PSA plan were adopted, it might be appropriate to repeal the integra-
tion rules for defined contribution plans as well as defined benefit plans. See infa text accom-
panying notes 105-07.
86. For an explanation of how Social Security benefits are currently calculated, see
Moore, supra note 59, at 985-90, and authorities cited therein.
87. See ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 32, at 29.
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plan would modify the current system's benefit formula by accelerating the
currently scheduled increase in the normal retirement age (NRA) so that the
NRA reaches sixty-seven by the year 2011,88 and increase the NRA thereafter
in conjunction with increases in life expectancy.8 9
Unlike the IA plan, the Advisory Council's PSA plan would dramatically
alter benefits promised by the current systen Specifically, the PSA plan
would replace the current system's weighted benefit formula with a first tier
flat benefit equal to $410 per month in 1996 dollars for workers with full
careers who were under the age of twenty-five in 1998. The PSA plan con-
templates that the first tier flat benefit of $410 monthly in 1996 dollars would
fully apply to workers under age twenty-five in 1998,9' but that it would be
slowly phased in for workers age twenty-five to fifty-four in 1998.' For these
workers, the accrued benefit would be calculated under present law as of Janu-
ary 1, 1998, and would be wage-indexed until the year the worker becomes
eligible to retire.' In addition, "[t]he flat benefit would be prorated to reflect
the proportion of potential work-years (out of [forty] years between [twenty-
two] and [sixty-one]) that occur under the new system."94 Like the IA plan, the
PSA plan would accelerate the currently scheduled increase in the NRA and
increase it thereafter in conjunction with increases in life expectancy. 5 The
PSA plan would also raise the earliest age at which benefits are available.96
Arguably, the IA plan's modification of the weighted benefit formula
could call for a recalculation of the current § 401(l) 0.75% maximum allow-
ance for integrated defined benefit plans because the 0.75% factor is designed
to approximate the current system's benefit accrual rate and the IA plan would
modify the benefit accrual rate. On the other hand, a strong argument can be
made that adoption of the IA plan would not require modification of the 0.75%
factor because the IA plan only modestly changes the current system's benefit
88. Under current law, a retired worker is entitled to receive unreduced Social Security
benefits at the NRA, 42 U.S.C. § 402(a), which is sixty-five for workers reaching age sixty-two
before 2000 and is scheduled to increase gradually to sixty-seven by 2022. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 416() (1994).
89. See ADVISoRY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 32, at 28-29. The IA plan would also








96. Id. The PSA plan would also alter benefits for spouses, surviving spouses, and dis-
abled workers, although those changes are not relevant for integration purposes. Id.
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formula and the 0.75% factor is merely an approximation ofthe current Social
Security benefit accrual rate, not an exact figure.' It however, the 0.75%
factor were modified, it would probably be increased to permit more integra-
tion because the IA plan reduces benefits for middle- and high-income earners
and thus increases the level of redistribution compared to the current system.
Adoption of the IA plan would, however, require modification of the
current law's requirement that no more than thirty-five years of service be
taken into account in detemining the maximum allowance in the case of total
benefits. Because the IA plan bases benefits on thirty-eight years of earn-
ings, rather than thirty-five years as under current law, the thirty-five years of
service limitation should be extended to thirty-eight years. Similarly, the
definition of covered compensation should be amended to extend from 'the
[thirty-five] year period" to "the [thirty-eight] year period ending withthe year
in which the employee attains the social security retirement age.""
Although adoption of the IA plan would not require a recalculation of the
0.75% factor, adoption of the PSA plan would mandate a recalculation. Un-
like benefit accruals under the IA plan, benefit accruals under the PSA plan,
at least once the system is fully phased in, would bear no resemblance to bene-
fit accruals under the current system. Thus, benefit accruals under the PSA
plan would bear no resemblance to the 0.75% factor. The benefit accrual rate
of the PSA first tier benefit "attributable" to employer contributions, once fully
phased in, should be relatively easy to calculate because the first tier is a flat
benefit, and the vast majority, if not all, of the first tier flat benefit would be
attributable to employer contributions."°
Calculating the benefit accrual rate attributable to employer contributions
during the PSA plan's lengthy transition period, however, could be much
more difficult. To the extent that transition benefits are attributable, at least
in part, to employer contributions, it could be quite difficult to calculate the
proper integration factor during this long transitionperiod. Onthe other hand,
97. See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text (explaining derivation of 0.75% factor);
see also Altman, supra note 10, at 482 n.188 (noting that prior to 1986 amendment to integra-
tion rules, employer portion of Social Security benefit for workers who earned maximum benefit
was calculated at 37.5% from 1942 through 1988 (when 1986 rules went into effect), even
though Social Security benefits had been adjusted over one dozen times during that period, not
including annual indexing that began in 1974).
98. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 401Q)(4XAXii), 40Q)(4)(BXii) (1994).
99. See id. § 401(i)(X5EXi).
100. See ADVISORY COUNaCL REPORT, supra note 32, at 30 (noting that "the tier I retire-
ment benefits, spouse benefits, and survivor and disability benefits would be financed by the
7.4 percent of payroll tax not used to fund PSAs," and that 6.2 percentage points of this tax
would be attributable to employer contributions, while only 1.2% would be attributable to
employee contributions).
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it is not clear that any of these transition benefits would be attributable to
employer contributions. The proponents ofthe PSA plan contemplate financ-
ing the transition costs by a combination of Federal borrowing and increased
taxes.101 They note that the Social Security Administration actuaries project
that a 1.52% supplement to the payroll tax for seventy-two years could finance
the transition costs."° The PSA proponents, however, state that they would
prefer to use a broad-based consumption tax rather than increasing payroll
taxes to finance the transition costs.1 I3 n addition, President Bush has barred
payroll tax increases as one of his six basic principles underlying Social
Security reform. 4 To the extent that the transition costs would not be funded
by any employer contributions, employers should not be given any credit for
integration purposes. Instead, even during the transition period, they should
only be given credit for the flat first tier benefit.
Moreover, even though it would be relatively easy to calculate the benefit
accrual rate for the flat first tier PSA benefit attributable to employer contribu-
tions, it is not clear that employers should be permitted such a credit. One of
the justifications typically given for integration is that because Social Security
replaces a larger percentage of the pre-retirement earnings of the lower-paid
than that of the higher-paid, some lower-paid workers might receive combined
pension and Social Security benefits that exceed 100% of their pre-retirement
earnings absent integration.0" Given the extremely low level of the first tier
benefit guaranteed by the PSA plan - $410 monthly in 1996 for workers under
age twenty-five in 1998, which is the equivalent of 65% ofthe current poverty
level for an elderly person living alone 6 - the first tier benefit hardly raises
a realistic concern of overpensioning low-wage earners. Thus, if the PSA plan
were implemented, there would be a strong argument for repealing the integra-




104. See Jackie CalmesBush SocialSecuri& PanelDoesn 'tFearPainfulSolutions, WAIL
ST. J., May 10, 2001, at A20 (noting that one of Bush's six principles bars payroll tax in-
creases).
105. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (noting justification for Social Security).
106. ADVISORY COUNCILREPORT, supra note 32, at 31.
107. Cf Altman, supra note 10, at 495 ("The law should permit qualified private pension
arrangements to be integrated with Social Security in only one situation. That situation is when,
without coordination, benefits from Social Security and qualified retirement plans in combina-
tion will result in overpensioning a segment of the work force."); Slusher, supra note 22, at 25
("[Ilf a reform proposal provides benefits that are not weighted in favor of low earners then the
validity of providers' stated motivation for integration - to counterbalance the progressiveness
of Social Security- would be diminished.").
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C. Effect of Partial Privatization on Integrated Plans
If partial privatization were to require modification or even repeal of the
current integration rules, partial privatization would likely cause employers to
amend the terms of their plans in order to adjust to the new rules. How em-
ployers would amend the terms of their plans, however, depends on the form
partial privatization would take and how it would change the integration rules.
For example, if the IA plan were adopted, employers with integrated
defined contribution plans probably would not change the term of their plans
because the IA plan would not increase the payroll tax imposed on employers
and would not require a change in the integration rules for defined contribution
plans." Employers with integrated defined benefit plans, on the other hand,
would likely change the terms of their plans because adoption of the 1A plan
would likely lead to a change in the integration rules for defined benefit plans.
If the 0.75% factor for integrated defined benefit plans were increased to
reflect the IA plan's reduction of benefits for middle- and higher-wage work-
ers, employers that integrate their defined benefit plans at the 0.75% factor
might reduce benefits for wages below the integration level to take advantage
of this increased level of permissible integration."°9 If, on the other hand, the
0.75% factor were not modified, then employers that integrate their defined
benefit plans at the 0.75% factor would not be permitted to increase their level
of integration. If the 1A plan were adopted and Social Security benefits were
based on thirty-eight years of wages rather than the current thirty-five years,
then employers who currently base benefits on thirty-five years of earnings
might amend their plans to base benefits on thirty-eight years of earnings.
Because wages tend to rise over time,110 basing benefits on thirty-eight years
of earnings rather than thirty-five years is likely to reduce retirement benefits
for most, if not all, workers in defined benefit plans with career earnings
formulas."'
108. Because the IA plan would increase the payroll tax on workers, workers might de-
crease their voluntary contributions to 401(k) plans. See infra Part II.B (discussing employees'
willingness to contribute to employer-sponsored defined contribution plans). Such plans, how-
ever, cannot be integrated plans. See Tress. Reg. § 1.401()-1(aX4Xiii) (2001) (barring availa-
bility of §§ 401(aX5XC) and 401(l) for elective contributions under § 1.401(k)-1(gX3)).
109. Employers, however, with integrated excess defined benefit plans that rely on the al-
ternative base contribution level or with integrated offset plans that rely on the 50% benefit that
would have accrued without regard to the offset reduction would only be able to take advantage
of the higher permissible integration level if they increased benefits for lower-wage workers as
well as higher-wage workers.
110. See Kathryn L. Moore, Raising the Social Security Retirement Ages: Weighing the
Costs and Benefits, 33 ARiz. ST. L.J. 554,584 & n.208 (2001) and authorities cited therein.
111. Cf. Julia Lynn Coronado et al., Distributional Impacts of Proposed Changes to the
SocialSecuritySystem, 13 TAx PoL'Y &ECON. 149,172-74 (1999) (showing that basing Social
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If the PSA plan were adopted, and no change were made to the integration
rules for defined contribution plans, then employers probably would not make
any changes to their integrated defined contribution plans. If, however, the
integration rules were changed, then employers might change the terms of their
integrated plans to adapt to such changes. For example, ifthe PSA plan were
adopted and financed by an increase in employer payroll taxes, then employers
that rely on the 5.7% maximum excess allowance in integrating their defined
contribution plans might increase their level of integration to take advantage
of the increase in the permissible allowance."' Moreover, if the PSA plan
were adopted and financed by an increase in the employer payroll tax, employ-
ers who do not currently integrate their defined contribution plans might elect
to integrate their plans in order to offset some of this increased cost.
If the PSA plan were adopted and the 0.75% factor were modified, then
employers with integrated defined benefit plans that rely on the 0.75% factor
might modify the terms of their plans to adjust to the change in the 0.75%
factor. How employers would adapt to such a change would depend on the
new integration factor. Because the PSA plan would dramatically reduce
guaranteed Social Security benefits, the PSA plan might result in a signifi-
cantly decreased level of permissible integration. Alternatively, because the
flat first tier benefit would represent an even larger percentage of low-wage
earnings relative to high-wage earnings than does the benefit provided by the
current system, the PSA plan might actually result in a higher level of permis-
sible integration, if it did not result in the repeal of integration.
In addition, again depending on how the 0.75% factor were modified,
employers with integrated defined benefit plans that do not rely on the 0.75%
factor might also modify the terms of their integrated plans to adapt to such
a change. Specifically, if the 0.75% factor were reduced to permit less
integration, then this lower permissible integration factor might require plans
that are currently limited by the alternative base benefit percentage limitation
for defined benefit excess plans or the 50% of benefit that would have accrued
without regard to the offset reduction limitation for defined benefit-offset
plans to reduce their level of integration.
Security benefits on all earnings for ages twenty-two through sixty-six rather than on highest
thirty-five years of earnings as under current law would reduce Social Security benefits for all
individuals); Memorandum from Keith Fontenot, Assistant Deputy Commissioner for Policy,
Social Security Administration, to Jane Ross, Deputy Commissioner for Policy, Social Security
Administration, tbl3 (May 18, 1999), available at http'//199.173.225.108/poliy/puba/mem
Distlmp.pdf (showing that basing Social Security benefits on highest thirty-eight or forty years
of earnings rather than on highest thirty-five years of earnings would reduce Social Security
benefits for all individuals).
112. To the extent that maximum integration level is limited by the alternative base con-
tribution percentage, employers would not be permitted to take advantage of any increase in the
5.7 percent maximum excess allowance under 26 U.S.C. § 401(C)(2XA) (1994).
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Finally, if the PSA plan were adopted and the integration rules were
repealed, some employers might terminate their integrated plans or at least
reduce plan benefits, including benefits for lower-wage workers. Because
participation in the current private pension system is purely voluntary, any
change in the law that has the effect of increasing the cost of plans or reducing
benefits for higher-paid workers may encourage some employers to reduce or
eliminate pension benefits." 3
D. Summary
Partial privatization of Social Security is likely to require a change in the
current integration rules and the terms of integrated plans. The significance
of the changes, however, depends on the specifics of the partial privatization
proposal. The more partial privatization would alter the terms of the current
Social Security system, the greater the changes partial privatization would
likely impose on the integration rules and integrated plans.
LU. Interaction with Other Links Between Social Security and
Private Pensions
Although integration is the only area of the law where Social Security
and private pensions are coordinated expressly, private pensions may be
113. Cf. IREPORTOFTHBE1994-1996ADvIsoRYCouNCiLoNSocLALSEcuRrY: REPORT
OFTHETECINICALPANELONTRENDSANDISSUESINRETmEMENTSAVINGS46 (1995) [hereinaf-
ter TECHNCAL PA LM] ("More recent studies tend to confirm that pension savings are sensitive
to tax policy, although the estimates are imprecise because of the difficulty of obtaining individu-
als' marginal income tax rates along with pension savings information."); STEPHEN WOODBURY
& WEr-SANG HUANG, THE TAX TREATMENT OF FRiNGE BENEFTS 139-40 & tbL4.13 (1991)
(finding that eliminating tax preference for benefits would cut employer contributions to pen-
sions by half with low-wage workers feeling greatest reduction in pension savings); Gregory,
supra note 6, at 314 ("To the extent that an employer's business circumstances restrict the
amount of resources that profitably can be allocated to compensation, increased social security
taxes - or, for that matter, any other increased cost to the employer as a result of social security
reform - will result in reductions in other components of the compensation package, including
employer sponsorship of and contributions to retirement plans."); Daniel I. Halperin, Special
Tax Treatment for Employer-Based Retirement Programs: Is It "Still" Viable as a Means of
IncreasingRetirement Income?, 49 TAXL. REV. 1, 5-6 (1993) (noting that "there may be limits
to how far one can push a voluntary program. No employer is required to have a pension plan.
Tax benefits may encourage adoption of a plan that otherwise would not exist, but if the availa-
bility of tax benefits depends upon satisfying significant requirements, there may not be enough
takers."); Colleen E. Medill, Targeted Pension Reform, 27 3. LEGS. 1, 97-99 (2001); see also
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 114 (1989) (noting that "Firestone and
its amici also assert that a de novo standard would contravene the spirit of ERISA because it
would impose much higher administrative and litigation costs and therefore discourage em-
ployers from creating benefit plans").
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linked explicitly or implicitly to Social Security in a number of other ways.'14
For example, defined benefit plans may define their normal retirement age as
the Social Security normal retirement age or they may provide early retirement
benefit subsidies that are eliminated upon the availability of Social Security
benefits. In addition, employees' demand for particular types of private pen-
sions may depend on the structure of their Social Security benefits, and their
investment behavior may be linked to the level of Social Security benefits that
they are guaranteed.
This section discusses how partial privatization is likely to affect private
pensions based on the explicit and implicit links between Social Security and
private pensions. Specifically, it considers how partial privatization is likely
to affect (1) employees' demand for defined benefit plans, (2) employees'
willingness to contribute to employer-sponsored defined contribution plans,
(3) employees' investment behavior with respect to the assets in their em-
ployer-sponsored plans, and (4) investment returns available to employer-
sponsored plans.
A. Demand for Defined Benefit Plans
In the last twenty years, the type of pension plan employers offer their
employees has shifted dramatically."' In 1980, 80% of all workers with an
114. Cf U.. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICEsupra note 6, at 17 ("Because Social Security has
a central role in providing retirement income, almost all pension plans are implicitly linked to
Social Security, insofar as their design takes into account the provisions of and benefits pro-
vided by Social Security."); SAMWIcK, supra note 6, at 22 ("Wh.enever there is a change to
Social Security, employers are induced to change their pension plans because, in light of the
change, another plan design may better achieve the savings objectives of the workers. All
pension plans are therefore implicitly linked to Social Security, since the optimal use of the tax
advantage of the pension depends on the other resources available to retirees."); Gregory, supra
note 6, at 319 (asserting that "virtually all employer-sponsored retirement plans assume their
participants will receive social security benefits under a structure similar to the current program.
Thus, while discussion of integration tend to focus on plans whose formulas are formally linked
in some way to social security benefits, in the broadest sense almost all plans are integrated.").
115. See William G. Gale & Joseph M. Milano, Implications of the Shift to Defined
ContributionPlansforRetirement WealthAccumulations, in LIVING WITHDEFD CONTRIBU-
ION PENSIONS: REMAKNGREsPONSBITY FORRETEmEN 115,116 (Olivia S. Mitchell &
Sylvester 3. Schieber eds., 1998) [hereinafter LIVING wrraDEFINED CONTMBUION PENSIONS]
("By almost any measure, the U.S. pension system has shifted toward defined contribution plans
over the past twenty years."); James M. Poterba & David A. Wise, Individual Financial Deci-
sions in Retirement Saving Plans and the Provision ofResourcesfor Retirement, in PRIVATIZ-
ING SOCIAL SEcUR1TY 363, 365 (Martin Feldstein ed., 1998) ("In the last decade and a ha, the
structure of the private pension system has shifted substantially from defined-benefit to defined-
contribution plans, and many individuals have taken advantage of opportunities for tax-deferred
saving in targeted retirement saving accounts."). Butsee EMPLOYEE BENErS RESEARCH INST.,
PENSION EVOLUION IN A CHANGING ECONOMY, SPECiAL REPORT Issum BRIEF 141 (1993)
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employer-sponsored pension were covered by a defined benefit plan."6 By
1999, the majority of workers with an employer-provided pension were
covered by a defined pension plan; only 40% of workers were covered by a
defined contribution plan.'
If Social Security were partially privatized, it too would shift the struc-
ture of retirement benefits toward a defined contribution system. The current
Social Security system is a purely defined benefit system."' Partial privatiza-
tion would graft a defined contribution layer of prefunded individual account
benefits onto the first tier defined benefit." 9
Defined benefit plans differ fundamentally from defined contribution
plans in that defined benefit plans place investment risk on the plan sponsor,
while defined contribution plans place investment risk on the plan partici-
pant. 2 " If Social Security were partially privatized, employees might increase
their demand for employer-sponsored defined benefit plans as employees seek
to offset some of the increased investment risk that partial privatization would
place on them.1
21
(questioning whether there really has been shift from defined benefit to defined contribution
plans: "While the net number of private defined benefit plans has declined and the net number
of defined contribution plans has increased significantly, there is little evidence of a shift from
defined benefit to defined contribution plans.").
116. Richard A. Ippolito, The New Pension Economics: Defined Contribution Plans and
Sorting, in THE FUTURE OFPRIVATE RETmEMENT PLANS 77,77 (Dallas L. Salisbury ed., 1999).
117. See id. at 80 & n.4 (stating that workers are considered covered by defined benefit
plan if they are covered by both defined contribution and defined benefit plan and that worker
is only considered covered by defined contribution plan if worker is only covered by defined
contribution plan). Olivia Mitchell and Sylvester Schieber offer four reasons for the growth in
defined contribution plans: (1) both employers and employees view defined contribution plans
as "flexible," (2) employers can target their matching contributions to reward specific behaviors
and types of employees, (3) defined contribution plans are often perceived as less expensive
than defined benefit plans, and (4) proponents of defined contribution plans contend that they
are less risky than defined benefit plans because defined contribution plans must always be fully
funded. Olivia S. Mitchell & Sylvester I. Schieber, Defined Contribution Pensions: New Op-
portunities, New Risks, in LUVnmG WITH DEFnED CoNTRiBToN PENSIONS, supra note 115, at
4-10. For additional theories explaining the shift toward defined contribution plans, see Colleen
E. Mdill, The IndividualResponsibiliv Model ofRetirementPlans Today: ConformingERISA
Policy to Reality, 49 EMoRYL.L 1, 6 n.24 (2000).
118. See Moore, supra note 7, at 348.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 347-48.
121. See ERISAINDUS. COMM, supra note 4, at 64 ("Shifting Social Security from a defined
benefit program toward a defined contribution program where individuals bear market risk by
the creation of individual Social Security accounts, could impose greater pressure on employers
to provide more benefits under defined benefit than under defined contribution plans - precisely
the opposite of current trends."); SAMWICK, supra note 6, at 13-14 ("Restoring financial solvency
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The extent that partial privatization would increase demand for defined
benefit plans would likely depend on the magnitude of the investment risk it
wouldplace on workers. Some partial privatization proposals, like the TAplan,
would only shift a relatively modest amount of investment risk to workers.'
Other partial privatization proposals, like the PSA plan, would shift substan-
tially more risk onto workers. The greater the amount of risk partial privatiza-
tion would shift to workers, the more likely partial privatization would cause
workers to increase their demand for employer-sponsored defined benefit
plans.
B. Employees' Willingness andAbility to Contribute to Employer-
Sponsored Defined Contribution Plans
Much of the recent shift towards defined contribution plans is attribut-
able to the dramatic growth of 401(k) plans over the last twenty years."2 The
number of 401(k) plans offered by employers grew from fewer than 25,000 in
1984 to more than 225,000 by 1996,124 and the pension industry says that it
expects this growth to continue.
125
401(k) plans differ fundamentally from most other employer-sponsored
retirement plans126 because they are funded principally by employees' volun-
tary contributions. 27 Although employers are permitted to contribute to
40 1(k) plans, they are not required to do so;" funding of 40 1(k) plans typi-
cally depends principally on employee choice and ability to save.'2
may also change the features of Social Security (e.g., reducing the annuitization of benefits),
causing a greater demand for these features in private pension plans.").
122. The IA plan would be funded by a relatively modest additional 1.6% payroll tax im-
posed on employees. ADVISORY COUNCILREPORT, supra note 32, at 28; see supra notes 86-94
and accompanying text (describing IA plan's changes to weighted benefit formula).
123. For a detailed discussion of this growth, see, for example, Medill, supra note 117, at
7-9.
124. See 9 Private Pension Plan Bulletin, Abstract of 1996 Form 5500 Annual Reports fig.
D (Winter 1999-2000) (on file with Washington andLee Law Review).
125. Medill supra note 117, at9.
126. Although most other employer-sponsored pension plans are funded solely by em-
ployer contributions, employees may be permitted to contribute to a few other types of em-
ployer-sponsored pensions such as § 403(b) annuities and § 408(p) simple retirement accounts.
Cf. 26 U.S.C. § 402(gX3) (1999).
127. See 26 U.S.C. § 401(kX2XA) (1994) (allowing employer to make contributions to
trust on behalf of employee).
128. See id §§ 401(kX12), 401(mX4) (1999) (allowing employer to make matching con-
tributions to fund).
129. Indeed, Colleen Medill refers to 401(k) plans as the "individual responsibility model"
of retirement savings. See Medill, supra note 117, at 4.
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Partial privatization of Social Security could have an impact on the will-
ingness of employees, particularly lower-income employees, to contribute to
401(k) plans. Even now, lower-income workers covered by 401(k) plans are
less likely to contribute to such plans than are higher-income workers, and
when they participate, lower-income workers generally 3' contribute a smaller
percentage oftheir income than do higher income workers."' Ifpartial privat-
ization, like the Advisory Council's IA plan, were accompanied by an increase
in the payroll tax imposed on employees,'32 employees, particularly lower-
income employees, might be even less willing and able to make voluntary
contributions to their 401(k) plans.
133
If partial privatization wereto cause lower-income workers to reduce their
contributions to 401(k) plans, it could have serious implications for highly
compensated employees who use such plans to defer income. As discussed
above,"3' § 401(a)(4) ofthe Internal Revenue Code requires that the contribu-
tions of an employer-sponsored retirement plan not discriminate in favor of
highly compensated employees in order for the plan to be qualified and thus
receive favorabletaxtreatment. Section401(k) imposes special nondiscrimina-
tion rules for 401(k) plans.3 5 In essence, the nondiscrimination rules require
130. Once pay exceeds $75,000 per year, contribution rates may decrease as salary in-
creases. See, e.g., Robert L. Clark & Sylvester J. Scheiber, Factors Affecting Participation
Rates and Contribution Levels in 401(k) Plans, in LIVING WIH DEFINED CoNTRIBUTIoN PEN-
SIONS, supra note 115, at 69,81 & tbl. 8.
131. See, e.g.,AlIClAH.MUL ETAL.,WHATDETERm s40l(K)PARTICiPATIONAND
CONTRIBUTIONS 14 (Ctr. for Ret. Research at Boston Coll. Working Paper 2000-12, 2000);
REPORT TO TBE CHAIRMAN, StrBCOM. ON SOCIAL SEcuRiy, COMm ON WAYS AND MEANS,
HOUSE OF REP., 401(K) PLANS: MANY TAKE ADVANTAGE OF OPPoRTrNrIY TO ENSURE ADE-
QUATE REn nEr INCOME 6,23 (GAO/HEHS-96-176 1996); Clark & Scheiber, supra note
130, at 74,80-81 & tbls.7-8; Richard P. Hinz & John A. Turner, Pension Coverage Initiatives:
Why Don't Workers Participate?, in LIVING W=H DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PENSIONS, supra
note 115, at 24-27 & tbls.1, 3; Andrea L. Kusko et al., Employee Decisions with Respect to
401(k) Plans, in LIVING WH FDEFRIED CONTRIBUTION PENSIONS, supra note 115, at 106-07 &
tbl.3.
132. At the symposium, Governor Gramlich, Chair of the 1994-1996 Advisory Council of
Social Security and proponent of the IA plan, contended that the 1.6% of payroll used to fund
the IA plan's individual accounts did not constitute an increase in "payroll taxes" because the
1.6% of payroll would be used to fund individual accounts, not current benefits. Regardless of
whether this 1.6% of payroll is characterized as a "payroll tx" or a mandatory savings contribu-
tion, it would impose an additional cost on employees that could affect their willingness to con-
tribute to employer-sponsored pension plans.
133. Cf inz & Turner, supra note 131, at3l-32 &tbl.7 (noting that most common reason
workers give for not contributing to the Federal Thrift Savings Plan is that they "can't spare the
money").
134. See supra Part IL
135. 26 U.S.C. § 401(kX3) (1999).
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that contributions for highly compensated employees not exceed contributions
for non-highly compensated employees by too great a percentage.136 If lower-
income workers were to reduce or even eliminate their voluntary contributions
to 401 (k) plans, thenthe ability of highly compensated employees to use 401 (k)
plans to defer income and thus, taxes might be reduced or even eliminated."3 7
Reduced voluntary contributions by lower-paid employees, however,
need not affect the ability of highly compensated employees to use 401(k)
plans to defer income and thus, taxes. If employers want to ensure that highly
compensated employees may use their 40 l(k) plans, then they can draft their
plans to satisfy one of two statutory safe harbors.'38 Under these safe harbors,
a 401(k) plan will automatically satisfy the nondiscrimination requirement if
the plan provides that either (1) the employer will contribute at least 3% of
compensation to all eligible non-highly compensated employees under the
plan regardless of how much, or whether, they voluntarily elect to contribute
to the plan 39 or (2) the employer will make a matching contribution equal to
100% of each non-highly compensated employee's elective 401(k) contribu-
tion in an amount up to 3% of the employee's compensation plus 50% of the
amount the employee contributes between 3% and 5% of compensation. 4°
Satisfying the statutory safe harbors, however, is not costless to employers.
It requires that they provide either nonelective contributions or matching con-
tributions.' 4' To the extent that employers are willing to bear these costs and
136. In order to satisfy the special nondiscrimination requirement, either (1) the actual de-
ferral percentage for eligible highly compensated employees must not be more than the actual
deferral percentage of other eligible employees multiplied by 1.25 (125% test) or (2) the excess
of the actual deferral percentage for eligible highly compensated employees must not be
(a) more than two percentage points more than the actual deferral percentage of all other em-
ployees and (b) more than twice the actual deferral percentage of all other eligible employees.
See 26 U.S.C. § 401(kX3XA) (1999). The actual deferral percentage is defined as the average
of the ratios (calculated separately for each employee in such group) of the amount of employer
contributions actually paid over to the trust on behalf of each such employee for such plan
year, to the employee's compensation for such plan year. See id. § 401(kX3)(B). For a more
detailed discussion of the nondiscrimination requirement, see, for example, CANAN, supra note
41, § 3.92.
137. Reduced contributions by lower-paid workers would not necessarily cause 401(k)
plans to be disqualified. Section 401(k) permits plans to return excess contributions to highly
compensated employees in orderto avoid disqualification of the plan. See 26 U.S.C. § 401(kX8)
(1999).
138. 26 U.S.C. § 401(kX12) (1999).
139. Id. § 401(kX12)(C).
140. See id § 401(kX12)(B). For a more detailed discussion of the § 401(k) statutory safe
harbors, see, for example, CANAN, supra note 41, at 241-46.
141. Some of the increased cost, however, may be offset by reduced administrative costs
because employers would no longer need to test their plans each year to ensure that they satisfy
the nondiscrimination requirements.
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draft their plans to satisfy the safe harbors, partial privatization of Social Se-
curity need not affect higher-paid workers' ability to contribute to and to re-
ceive the tax advantages of 40 l(k) plans.
Second, even if partial privatization were not accompanied by an increase
in the payroll tax imposed on workers, partial privatization could have an
impact on all employees' willingness to contribute to 401(k) plans. The in-
creased investment risk partial privatization entails could encourage employ-
ees to increase their contributions to 401 (k) plans to offset some of this risk.
142
In addition, partial privatization could encourage employees who currently
contribute little or nothing to 401(k) plans to increase their contributions as
they gain knowledge and experience as investors. 43 On the other hand, partial
privatization could reduce employees' willingness to contribute to 401(k)
plans as they see their Social Security individual account balances grow.'"
Relatively little is known about what motivates employees to save in general
and to contribute to 401(k) plans in particular. 45 Thus, it simply is not clear
142. See SAMWICK, supra note 6, at 32 (contending that if Social Security were partially
privatized, "the added risk will encourage a greater level of total saving, particularly among
patient workers who are already saving for retirement They will seek to increase their contribu-
tions to pensions to provide this higher income in retirement when their total income is subject
to more risk").
143. Cf EMPLOYRE BENEFTS RESEARCHINST., ISSUE BRIEFNO. 183,AFRAMEwoRKFoR
ANALYZING AND COMPARING SOCIAL SEcURrnY POLICIES 18 (1997) [hereinafler EBRI ISSUE
BRIEF No. 183] ("If the new Social Security program has a defined contribution component
with educational efforts, will this increase workers' awareness of the necessity and benefits of
saving as well as the potential effects of inflation and thereby increase worker participation in
employment-based pension plans?"); Scorr WmSBENNER, Do PENSION PLANS wrr PARici-
PANT INVDEsTMM CHOICE TEACHHOUSEHOLDS TO HOLD MORE EQUrrY? 11(1999) (finding
that households covered by pension plans in which employees have investment choice are more
likely to hold stock outside of their retirement plan than are households covered by pension
plans with employee investment choice); Moore, supra note 7, at 362 & n.86 (citing studies
that "show that employer-provided retirement education increases both the number of employ-
ees who participate in retirement savings plans and the amount that they save in these pro-
grams.").
144. Cf EBRIISsUEBRIEFNO. 183,supra note 143, at 18 ("Ifprivate investment accounts
are incorporated into Social Security, would workers, upon seeing large accumulations in their
Social Security accounts, be less likely to invest in employment-based plans?"); Gcregory, supra
note 6, at 324 ('Will employees be motivated to increase their savings in 401(k) and other plans
as they see their account balances increasing in their social security account? Or will they
assume that the social security account will be sufficient and decrease their other retirement
savings?").
145. See TECHNICALPANEL, supra note 113, at43 (stating that "researchers do notyet have
a fully unified theory of why people save."); Alan J. Auerbach & Laurence J. Kotlikof The
Impact ofDemographic Transition on Capital Formation, in DEMOGRAPHYAND RETRm N:
THE TWEN1Y-FRSTCENmY 163,168 (AnnaM. Rappaport& SylvesterJ. Schieber eds., 1993)
[hereinafter DEMOGRAPHY AN RETIREMENT] ("Whatever the cause, the sobering lesson of the
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what effect the creation of individual accounts would likely have on workers'
willingness to contribute to 401(k) plans.
146
C. Employees'Investment Behavior
As the private pension landscape has shifted toward defined contribution
plans in general and 401(k) plans in particular, 47 employees' responsibility
for investing the assets in their employer-sponsored retirement plans has
increased. Although the law does not require that workers make the invest-
ment decisions with respect to their 401(k) plan assets, most 401(k) plans
authorize employees to decide how to invest the assets in their 401(k) plans.
For example, in 1997, 86% of 401(k) plans offered by medium and large
establishments to full-time employees permitted employees to choose invest-
ments with respect to their own contributions, and 65% of such plans permit-
ted employees to choose investments with respect to their employer's contri-
butions as well.' 4
Partial privatization could have an impact on how employees choose to
invest the assets in their employer-sponsored defined contribution plans.
Specifically, partial privatization could cause workers to invest their 401(k)
plan assets more conservatively as they seek to reduce the increased risk
partial privatization would impose on. their retirement income. 49 Ideally, to
1980's is that economists still have a very limited understanding of U.S. saving behavior.");
Gregory, supra note 6, at 323 (noting that "[v]ery little microeconomic research exists regarding
what motivates employees to save in a pension plan"); Alicia R Munnell, Discusion, in DEm-
OGRAPHY AND RETIMLNENT, supra, at 183,185 (asserting that "[t]he important point is that the
economics profession does not really understand saving or saving behavior"). For an overview
of current research on the subject, see SAMWICK, supra note 6, at 14-22.
146. Cf TECHIMcAL PANELT, supra note 113, at 47 (stating that "it is far from clear how
aggregate savings and retirement patterns would be affected by radical changes in Social Se-
curity, for instance, if... all or part of the Social Security system were replaced with a national
defined-contribution system").
147. Thrift and savings plans are not the only kind of defined contribution plan an em-
ployer can offer. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATiSTiCS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABoR, EMPLOYEE BENE-
Frrs iN MEDIUM AND LARGE PRPVATE ESTABUm SENTs 1997, at 115 (1999) (identifying five
different types of defined contribution plans that employers can offer). Nevertheless, employees
are much more likely to participate in a thrift and savings plan than any other type of defined
contribution plan. See it at 5 tbl.1 (illustrating that 39% of workers participated in savings and
thrift plans compared to 13% in deferred profit sharing plans, 4% in ESOPs, 8% in money
purchase plans, 1% in stock bonus plans, and 1% in others).
148. See id. at 135 tbl.177.
149. See SAMWICK, supra note 6, at 32 (contending that if Social Security were partially
privatized, "workers will attempt to reduce the riskiness of their other financial asset portfolios
to temper the amount of total risk that they face. Defined contribution assets can be expected
to shift toward safer assets.").
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test this hypothesis, a study would examine any change in employees' invest-
ment behavior when an employer with both a defined contribution plan and
a defined benefit plan eliminates the defined benefit plan. Unfortunately, no
such dataset is currently available. 50
As a second best alternative, Cori Uccello of the Urban Institute com-
pared how employees with an underlying defined benefit plan invested their
401(k) assets relative to employees who had no underlying defined benefit
plan. She found that 401(k) participants with an underlying defined benefit
plantendedto investtheir 401(k) assets more aggressivelythan 401(k) partici-
pants with no underlying defined benefit plan.'
Unfortunately, the Uccello study is subject to a number of data limita-
tions. First, it only provides three categories of investment: "(i) mostly or
entirely in stocks (including company stock), (ii) mostly or entirely in interest
earning assets (referred to hereafter as bonds), or (iii) split between stocks and
bonds." 2  Second, it does not separately account for company stock."53
Finally, it is not clear whether participants are referring to allocations of
contributions or account balances.' 54 Despite these data limitations, the study
supports the proposition that by reducing guaranteed benefits, partial privat-
ization of Social Security could cause workers to invest their 401(k) assets
more conservatively,5 ' and it is the best study that is currently available to
assess the likely effect of partial privatization on employees' investment
decisions.
150. Telephone Conversation with Jack L. VanDerhel, Associate Professor of Risk Man-
agement and Insurance, Fox School ofBusiness and Management, Temple University (Mar. 21,
2001).
151. See Cor E. Uccello, 401(k) Investment Decisions and Social Security Reform, 5 N.




BALANCES, AND LoAN AcTivrnIYI 1999, EBRI IssuE BRiEF No. 230, 14-15 & tbL8 (2001)
(showing that 57% of participants who do not invest in equities funds invest in their own
company's stock).
154. See Uccello, supra note 151, at 73. This, however, may not be a significant data
limitation. See Vickie L. Bajtelsmit & Jack VanDerheL, RiskAversion and Pension Investment
Choices, in POSrTONINGPENSIONSFORTHETWENTY-FIRSTCENTURY45, 60 (MichaelS. Gordon
et al. eds., 1997) (finding that same factors affect both allocation of contributions and allocation
of balances).
155. See Uccello, supra note 151, at 78 ("[]f the implementation of a Social Security
individual account system is offiet by a reduction in the defined benefit nature of the program,
participants might direct their account assets more conservatively than they do in the current
401(k) system.").
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D. Investment Returns
As of 1995, private pension plans held about $2.7 billion in assets; 56
42% of those assets were invested in equities, 27% were invested in bonds,
7% were held in cash items, and the remaining 24% were invested in other
assets. 5 If Social Security were partially privatized, it could significantly
affect the rates of return available on those assets.
In the short run, partial privatization would likely increase the demand
for equities and thus raise the price of equity investments."' The short run
effect of partial privatization on the demand for and value of U.S. treasury
bonds would depend on how partial privatization were financed. If individual
accounts were funded by additional payroll taxes, as in the Advisory Coun-
cil's IA plan, then partial privatization would likely have little effect on the
short run demand for and value of U.S. treasury bonds, unless many workers
chose to invest their individual accounts in U.S. treasury bonds rather than
private equities. On the other hand, ifpartial privatization simply were funded
by diverting payroll taxes from the current Trust Fund, then partial privatiza-
tion would likely cause the demand for and the value of U.S. treasury bonds
to decrease in the short run.
In the long run, partial privatization's increased demand for equities
could cause the long-run rates of return on equities to fall, 159 particularly if
156. EBRIDATABooKONEMPoYEEBENEFITS 100 tbl.11.3 (4thed. 1997).
157. Id.
158. Cf Bone, supra note 3, at 344 (noting that proposal to invest Social Security trust
assets in private domestic equities "would appear likely to increase short-term demand for
equities and so raise value of current equity investments"). This assumes that some workers
are constrained and thus currently invest less in the equities market than they would under a
partially privatized Social Security system. See JOHN GEANAKOPOLOS ET AL., WOULD APRIVA-
TIZED SOCIAL SECURIY SYSTEM REALLY PAY A HIGHER RATE OF RETuIRN? 22 (Nat'l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6713, 1998) (noting that if there is large number of
constrained households, then Social Security diversification would cause "an increase in the
demand, and thus in the price of stocks and a corresponding decline in their expected return").
159. Cf. BERNsTEIN & BERNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 245 ("Increased stock prices reduce
earnings.");EBRIIsuEBRIEFNO. 183,supra note 143, at 15 (maintaining that "higher demand
for equities might mean that equity prices could be bid up, causing their long-range rates of
return to fall"); GEANAKOPLOS ET AL., supra note 158, at 22 ("The most important general
equilibrium effect of diversification would be an increase in the demand, and thus in the price,
of stocks and a corresponding decline in their expected return."); Robert J. Myers, Privatization
ofSocial Securify: A GoodIdea?, J. AM. SOc'Y OF CLU & CHFC, at 45 (July 1996) (asserting
that "[i]f such huge amounts of money were available for investment in common stocks, then
it is likely that rates of return will be lower than historical ones. Such massive new investment
would probably produce some desirable economic growth, but there are limits to this effect.
Moreover, the vast majority of the private contributions would go into the secondary capital
markets, rather than into issues which would generate new capital.").
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large numbers of individuals seek to sell their equity investments at the same
time.'6° Demand, however, is not the only relevant factor in long run rates of
return. As two leading researchers have noted, "[c]apital markets are world-
wide, interest rates are determined by both supply and demand, and forecasts
of financial rates of return some 30 or more years into the future are futile.""
Thus, determining the long run effects of partial privatization on rates of
return is an extremely complex macroeconomic question that depends, among
other things, upon whether partial privatization would lead to increased
national savings, 62 and cannot be readily answered." Thus, this Article will
not attempt to determine how partial privatization of Social Security would
likely affect long run rates of return on assets held by private pensions; suffice
it to say that partial privatization could have a substantial effect, although it
is not clear what that effect would be.
160. See SYLVESTER J. SCruBBER & JOHN B. SHOVEN, ThE AGING OF THE BABYBOOM
GENERATION 18-20 (1996) (noting that retirement of baby boomers could cause rate of return
on equities to fall by roughly 5% per year between 2010 and 2030, but contending that presence
of global capital market, rational expectations, and fact that corporate assets are cash-generating
depreciable property is likely to alleviate at least some of that decrease).
161. Sylvester J. Schieber & John B. Shoven, The Consequences ofPopulation Agingfor
Private Pension Fund Saving andAssetMarkets, in THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF AGING IN THE
UNITED STATES AND JAPAN 111,130 (Michael D. Hurd & Naohiro Yashiro eds., 1997)
162. See HENRY J. AARON ET AL, CAN AMERICA AFFORD To GROW OLD? PAYING FOp,
SOCIAL SECURrTY 119 (1989) ("Over the long run, privatizing OASDI would raise national
saving only to the extent that it leads to the accumulation of increased pension reserves or to
smaller deficits on other government programs. If private pensions invest in riskier assets and
generate correspondingly higher rates of return than OASDHI reserves earn, some secondary
economic effects would follow similar to those resulting from a policy of investing OASDHI
reserves in risky assets.").
163. Cf GEANAKOPLOS ET AL., supra note 158, at 22 n.38 (arguing that "Social Security
diversification would bring some indirect benefits to the economy, if there were many con-
strained households. Unconstrained households would end up holding less stock, because some
of it would be in the hands of social security accounts held by constrained households who
could not buy stock previously. Thus unconstrained households would bear less risk. They
would be inclined to shift the mix of investment projects undertaken toward more risky ones.
This might in turn raise future GDP."); PeterA. Diamond, What StockMarket Returns to Expect
for the Future?, 63 Soc. SEC. BULL. 38,49-50 n.45 (2000) ("One can also ask how changed
policies might affect future returns. A change in portfolio policy that included stocks (whether
in the trust fund or in individual accounts) would plausibly lower the equity premium some-
what That effect could come about through a combination in a rise in the Treasury rate
(thereby requiring a change in tax and/or expenditure policy) and a fall in expected returns on
stocks. The latter depends on both the underlying technology of available returns to real invest-
ments and the effect of portfolio policy on national saving. At this time, research on this issue
has been limited, although it is plausible that it is not large." (citations omitted)); see also
AARON ET AL., supra note 162, at 106-14 (discussing macroeconomic effects of investing Social
Security reserves in private market).
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IV Conclusion
Partial privatization of Social Security would likely have an impact on
private pensions. First, partial privatization could have a significant impact on
the tax integration rules and integrated plans, although the impact depends on
the form partial privatization takes and how significantly it would affect bene-
fits promised by the current Social Security system. Second, contrary to
current trends, partial privatization would likely increase the demand for
employer-sponsored defined benefit plans. Third, partial privatization could
decrease the willingness of workers, particularly lower-income workers, to
contribute to 401(k) plans, particularly if partial privatization were funded by
an increase in the payrolltax imposed on workers. Fourth, partial privatization
could cause workers to invest their 401 (k) assets more conservatively. Finally,
partial privatization could affect the rates of return available to assets held by
private pensions, although it is not entirely clear what the effect would be.
